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Abstract 
In this paper we study the returns on a set of different strategies, which are based on 
the sign and magnitude of the pre-earnings announcement return for a group of US 
stocks and for some international markets which provides an additional measure of 
robustness. We also propose a new methodology for the evaluation of abnormal 
returns. Evidence is found that stocks with negative abnormal returns on the days 
prior to the earnings announcement have a subsequent higher return on the days 
following the announcement. A trading strategy based on these findings is then 
reproduced and its results are analyzed. 
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1 - Introduction 
Can market reaction to earnings be anticipated? The earnings announcement has long 
been the focus of finance and accounting research. Some study market reaction to 
unexpected results others focus on trends after the announcement but what if there 
was a measure known before the event that predicted a trend for the announcement 
itself? 
In this paper we propose a new methodology that aims to do just that by applying the 
concept of abnormal returns to the period before the earnings announcement and 
then looking for trends in the subsequent market behavior of stocks. While it seems 
that in an efficient market such a relation could not exist there are in fact several 
reasons why this could happen. If there is advanced knowledge of the earnings results 
by a significant mass of market participants it is possible that this information 
asymmetry is creating certain distinct patterns which would form before the earnings 
announcement. It is also possible that due to the increased risk that is present during 
the earnings period investors perceive their investments differently which would cause 
them to engage in unusual behaviors. 
We know that the pre-earnings period is characterized by increased volatility, 
however, if every market participant has access to the same information it is irrational 
to think that stocks are more risky in this period. According to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis changes in the price of a stock should be a consequence of unexpected 
information reaching the markets, however, before the information is available there 
is no reason why a certain stock should move significantly either way. 
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The question we propose to explain is whether these seemingly irrational moves, 
before the earnings announcements, can give investors a clue to the subsequent 
market reaction and if this relation is significant to the extent that it can be used to 
create a trading strategy that can generate meaningful returns to an investor. 
 
2 - Literature Review 
The subject of whether the Efficient Market Hypothesis is true and in what form has 
long been a controversial subject of academic theory with several papers trying to 
prove its existence while others propose to refute it. Despite this ongoing debate, 
market anomalies have been documented to exist in the markets. 
Such an anomaly is the post-earnings-announcement drift first presented in Ball and 
Brown (1968). This phenomenon states that a stock with positive (negative) market 
reaction immediately after earnings announcements tends to have better (worse) 
performance in the following period. This anomaly has, since then, become the focus 
of a number of studies. 
Of the papers intending to build on this field of work we must emphasize Bernard and 
Thomas (1990) who find that in a four quarter time period the post-earnings drift 
suffers a reversal as the relationship is inversed and Brandt, Kishore, Santa-Clara and 
Venkatachalam (2006) introduce the Earnings Announcement Return (EAR) as an 
alternative measure to the Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) which 
incorporates the impact of other information that is released at the same time as the 
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earnings announcements but is very often not accounted for in the estimates released 
by analysts and find that the EAR methodology is able to generate a better post-
earnings drift than the SUE.  
It is a fact that most studies related to earnings announcement focus in earnings 
announcement itself and the post-earnings period. However, in recent years, some 
papers have started to fill the blank on the pre-earnings research. Of which are an 
example Affleck-Graves, Jennings and Mendenhall (1994) who focus on the use of 
insider transactions by institutional investors before earnings announcements and 
Angel, Christophe and Ferri (2002) who focus on the relation between insider 
transactions and short-selling during this period. While our objective does not directly 
involve insider transactions it is in this body of work, market behavior prior to earnings 
announcements, that this paper is inserted. 
 
3 – Data and Methodology 
3.1 – Data 
For this paper we obtained daily returns and earnings announcement’s dates for the 
current constituents of the S&P 500, S&P Mid and S&P Small which represent a total of 
1500 companies. This data covers the time period from January 1998 to December 
2008, a total of 11 years. With 4 announcements per year per company this would 
theoretically imply 66.000 observations, however in reality the sample contains fewer 
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workable observations (50.615) due to some missing data and securities that have not 
been trading since the beginning of the study period. 
Additionally, for the purpose of testing whether the findings can be extended to other 
relevant international markets we collected the same information for the constituents 
of the FTSE 100, DAX, CAC 40 and Nikkei 225. 
Daily returns of the indices studied were also collected as a proxy for market returns in 
that country as well as 3-month US treasury bills for risk-free returns. All returns and 
earnings dates were taken from Bloomberg. Treasury bills were obtained from the US 
treasury website. 
 
3.2 - Methodology 
In this paper we introduce a new methodology to look for abnormal returns (in excess 
of the market) in the days prior to the announcement date. For that purpose we use 
two different methods of estimating pre-earnings market reaction. 
The Average Abnormal Return (AAR) is a measure of the average behavior of stock  on 
the  days preceding the earnings announcement. This will be calculated as the return 
of the stock minus the average return of the market in those n days. 
 =

	

 , − ,
	

     (1) 
Where , is the return of stock  at time , , is the market return at time ,  is the 
earnings announcement date and  is the number of observed days before the event. 
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The use of the market return allows for a better assessment of relative performance of 
the security when compared to the market as a whole on each day. This enables the 
abnormal return to work as a form of comparison between stocks by measuring 
divergence from the mean. 
The Successive Abnormal Return (SAR) is a measure of the average behavior of stock  
on the  days preceding the earnings announcement. This works similarly to a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the company had positive (1) or negative (-1) abnormal 
returns in all of the n days (and their signal). In case it presented mixed abnormal 
returns SAR will be defined as 0. 
 = 1  , − , > 0, ∀ ∈ 1,     (2) 
 = −1  , − , < 0, ∀ ∈ 1,     (3) 
Where , is the return of stock  at time , , is the market return at time ,  is the 
earnings announcement date and  is the number of observed days before the event. 
Since for most securities in the sample the data available only includes the earnings 
date and not the time of day, it is necessary that the event period be defined as the 
period going from the close of the market on   − 1 to the close on  + 1. This ensures 
a window around the earnings announcement day that encompasses the whole 24 
hours of a day, not just trading hours, as the earnings announcements are very often 
released either before the market opens or after the close. 
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For a sub-group of the S&P 500 sample (8792 observations) the data contains the 
actual time during the day when the announcement took place which allowed for a 
more narrow post-event period of a single trading day which is the return from the 
close on  to  + 1 in case the release is made after market close or the close 
on  − 1 to  when it is made either before market open or during trading hours. 
Due to the complexity of integrating data from two different sources into a single 
database and the huge amount of observations, matlab and a computer script 
developed using the python programming language were used in addition to a 
conventional spreadsheet application. This significantly reduced the computational 
power and time needed to develop the calculations and at the same time enabled 
more complex procedures that would not have been possible otherwise. 
 
4 - Results 
4.1 – Average Abnormal Return 
For the AAR method we analyze different values for the number of observed days in 
order to establish which measure can give an investor better returns. The values 
chosen are 3, 5, 10 and 20. 
From Table 1 it is possible to conclude that for AAR lower than 0 using less days in the 
estimation improves the expected profits (0,91% for 3 days and 0,79% for 20 days in 
the S&P 500). On the other hand for AAR greater than 0 using less days reduces the 
returns (0,22% for 3 days 0,32% for 20 days in the S&P 500), however, these are still 
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quite weak when compared to any negative AAR measure even the ones with lower 
results. If we reflect on the fact that the holding period for each trade is merely two 
days we can see that the expected return of the negative AAR over a year is quite large 
(even accounting for the fact that earnings announcements are generally condensed in 
a small time period during each quarter).  
The strategy presents the best results for S&P Mid (1,27% 3 day AAR) and worst for 
S&P 500 (0,91%), but the difference between these samples is not very significant 
which seems to indicate that this effect is independent of company size. 
The economic significance of the results demands that we further analyze with more 
attention the returns on a strategy based on a 3 day negative Average Abnormal 
Return  which have a great return profile and at the same time make for a more 
parsimonious model that involves fewer inputs than the longer AAR measures.  
To further study the 3 day AAR measure we estimated the following regression: 
 = # + $ ∗      (4) 
Where R is the compounded return of a stock for the event, AAR is the corresponding 
3 day AAR measured before the event and alpha and beta are estimated regression 
parameters. 
From Table 2 we can see that, as expected, AAR has a negative impact (-0,36 for S&P 
500) in the return of a stock after the earnings announcement which confirms the 
findings of the tables above that already indicated that lower (higher) AAR is better 
(worse) from an average return point of view. It is also interesting to analyze the 
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intercepts which seem to indicate that holding stocks through the earnings 
announcement period is generally slightly profitable. We can also see from the t-tests 
that all estimated parameters are significantly different from 0 at a 95% confidence 
level (p-values are all 0%). R-squared, as expected in a predictive regression, is quite 
low at 1% for the three size based samples. 
It is also interesting to observe the behavior of expected returns for more demanding 
negative values of AAR. In Table 3 we can see that for the S&P 500 lower values of AAR 
will have a higher expected return where 0 has the lowest return (0,91%) and –PI% the 
best (4,21%), however being more demanding also means that there will be less 
investment opportunities. Over the course of the sample (11 years) there were only 
243 observations, for the S&P 500, where AAR was lower than –PI%  (compared with 
8636 for lower than 0), this translates into about 22 per year. Standard deviation also 
tends to become higher for lower AAR (16,7%) which signifies that even though the 
returns are better they are more volatile. These values appear to be quite robust as 
the p-values are 0% for the hypothesis that returns are equal to 0.   
As previously observed, the midsized stocks have the best expected return values for 
negative AAR when compared to the other size based samples and this is also true for 
more demanding values of AAR (4,75% for AAR lower than –PI%).  We can also see that 
this sample presents less investment opportunities (only 6487 for negative AAR) which 
may be related to the fact that the S&P MID index has the fewer components of the 
three indices. Otherwise the observations made previously for the S&P 500 hold true 
for this sample as well. 
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The S&P SMALL index is the sample which presents more investment opportunities 
through the period. This is especially true for the more demanding values of AAR 
where the quantity of observation with AAR lower than –PI% (476) is much larger than 
for the other two samples (243 for S&P 500 and 196 for S&P MID) to such a degree 
that it cannot be simply explained by the greater number of components in this index 
(600 compared to 500 and 400). This leads us to believe that a smaller company is 
more likely to present extreme values of AAR which could be related to the fact that 
generally small stocks are more volatile than larger stocks. This is also reflected in the 
standard deviation which is greater than what was observed in the other two samples 
(9,4% for negative AAR compared with 7,1% and 7,7%). As before p-values are all 0%. 
An analysis of Figure 1 shows that the assumption that stock returns follow a normal 
distribution is not verified for stocks with negative AAR. We can see that there is a 
positive skewness (right tail is longer) and that the distribution has a higher peak 
(kurtosis is 18,7
1
) than the normal distribution. The negation of this assumption has 
implications for the use of standard deviation as an effective measure of risk. 
 
4.2 – Successive Abnormal Return 
For the SAR method we compute statistics only for the 3 day SAR case. The reason for 
this is that this test requires that abnormal returns have the same sign every day, so 
                                                           
1
 The formula used to calculate the kurtosis value presented is adjusted so that a normal distribution 
would have kurtosis equal to zero. 
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increasingly higher values will be more restrictive and generate samples that are too 
small to be analyzed with the degree of robustness we desire for this study. 
In Table 4 we can see that the SAR method, like the AAR method, finds low returns for 
stocks that had positive abnormal returns in the days prior to the earnings 
announcements (-0,12% for S&P 500).  From the analysis of the confidence intervals 
and p-values, at a 95% confidence interval, statistically we cannot exclude the 
hypothesis that the average return is in fact equal to zero. 
On the other hand, stocks with negative SAR present high expected returns (1,13% for 
S&P 500) and as before the mid-sized stocks appear to be the best investment choice 
(1,58%). Volatility also displays the pattern seen before where smaller stocks present 
higher volatility in the time around the earnings. Once again p-values are all 0%. 
We have shown that a strategy based on the SAR method can also be used to generate 
high returns. However since the two strategies are not independent (a stock with 
negative SAR will necessarily also have negative AAR) combining the two strategies 
should not improve the results. 
 
4.3 – Timed Data 
While we were forced to use two day holding periods for the calculations done before, 
for a sub-set of the S&P 500 stocks (8792 observations) there is information on the 
exact time during the day when the announcement took place. For these stocks it is 
then possible to obtain a holding period of one day. 
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This sub-sample, while smaller, presents descriptive statistics very similar to what was 
observed before in the full sample which leads us to believe that partitioning the 
sample has not introduced any sort of bias that could put into question if our findings 
would work similarly for the full S&P 500. 
From these results we can construct strategies that invest every day in the stocks that 
will be presenting results in the following day. Because the number of required 
investments differs from day to day, sometimes consisting of a single security, we 
define various levels of maximum portfolio exposure to a single stock in the portfolio. 
Table 5 shows that, as expected from the average returns per trade, the strategy is 
much more profitable (115%) than the S&P 500 index which for this period had a 
negative average return (-0,83%). From an absolute return perspective using a 
negative AAR strategy with no investment limit yields the best results but this is also 
the riskiest strategy as it means that sometimes the whole portfolio is invested in a 
single security. What is most curious is that some of the more limited strategies (25% 
and 10% limits) have a standard deviation similar to that of the S&P 500 (21,3% 
standard deviation) which could imply similar risk but with much better returns. To 
compare the various strategies we chose the Sharpe ratio as a risk adjusted measure of 
performance and find that results are very similar for all different limits, although the 
limited strategies seem to have a slight advantage (2,30 compared with 2,16 for the 
no-limit strategy). 
It is important to remember that these strategies have a high portfolio rotation and so 
trading costs such as commissions, bid-ask spread, price impact while not considered 
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in this study, should be a concern for an implementation of this strategy. The fast 
rotation of the portfolio and short window of opportunity for buying the stocks also 
makes this strategy quite difficult to implement in a large scale. 
 
4.4 - International Markets 
Another important question that needs to be asked is whether this phenomenon is 
restricted to the US or is it present in other markets. To test this we use samples from 
the main international markets in developed countries. The chosen markets were 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. For each of these markets stocks were 
chosen from the main index for each market which should contain the largest and 
most representative stocks from that country. These indices are respectively: FTSE 100, 
CAC 40, DAX and Nikkei 225. 
These markets were chosen because of the fact that data is available, for earnings and 
returns, in long time series as well as the fact that this markets are largely considered 
to be the most liquid after the US which should reduce the risk of market 
imperfections distorting the results. 
We can see from Table 6 that this strategy is, to some degree, valid for all this markets 
with the UK being the market that presents the results most similar to the US (0,92%). 
On the other hand France and Japan have more modest results (0,55% and 0,4% 
respectively). For France the lower bound of the 95% confidence intervals is barely 
zero (p-value is 5,45%), partly due to the fact that this results are drawn from a small 
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sample. For Japan the sample size should not be an issue (6029 observations), however 
this is a market notorious for behaving differently than the rest which may imply this 
phenomenon is related to a behavior characteristic of western investors not present in 
Japan. 
 
5 - Random Days 
From the analysis made in the previous chapters we can determine that these 
strategies which exploit abnormal returns in the days previous to the earnings 
announcements can generate large returns. However, it is essential to establish if this 
is solely true for the days studied or if it is a phenomenon that is present every day. A 
possibility is that the strategy is only describing a short-term mean reversal that is not 
exclusive to earnings dates. The short-term mean reversal is a known effect that 
following large changes in price stocks will suffer a reversal in the opposite direction. 
For this purpose we randomly pick 18000 dates from the time period used in the above 
samples and match this to the constituents of the S&P 500. We then compute 
descriptive statistics in order to establish if there is a significant difference between 
this sample and the S&P sample from before. 
Table 7 clearly shows that there is a significant difference between these two samples 
(0,7% significant at a 95% confidence level). It must also be noted that standard 
deviation is much smaller for the sample composed of regular days. This indicates that 
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in regular days, even after large relative declines, stocks will be, in the following days, 
less volatile than around earnings.  
However, it is curious to see that the frequency of stocks that pass the AAR criteria is 
not that different in the two samples. From that one may conclude that even though 
stocks are more volatile after the earnings announcement they present the same 
trading patterns before earnings announcements as they do on regular days. Due to 
the very low standard errors of the random sample (0,04%), even though average 
returns are not very large (0,21%) they are still significantly different from zero at a 
95% confidence level for negative values of AAR. 
A Q-Q plot of the two samples (Figure 2) was used to further compare the two 
samples. It corroborates the evidence found, by showing that they have a linear trend 
in the quartiles’ relationship, but this trend has a low slope which means that the 
observed values at each quartile are generally greater for the Earnings sample, as 
predicted from the analysis of the mean differences. The values deviate most from this 
trend in the lower left side of the figure which implies that during earnings days, a 
company presenting bad results is expected to have its stock lose more than in the 
worse days of regular trading. 
This evidence leads us to state that this strategy cannot be simply described as a short-
term mean reversion that would be present every day and so the application of this 
strategy is shown to be intrinsically linked to special corporate events such as the 
earnings announcements. 
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6 – Potential Causes 
After we have consistently established the robustness of this relationship it is 
important to discuss some of the possible reasons that may be behind this 
phenomenon. We are interested in knowing why certain stocks are heavily sold by 
investors in the days prior to the earnings announcements, while others are 
accumulated. There must be a fundamental reason behind this behavior which if 
known could further propel the development of more efficient and specialized 
abnormal return measures for the pre-earnings period. 
The initial assumption that such a relation could be present because of the effect of 
insider trading is dispelled as the evidence shows a reversal in pre-earnings trends 
which means there is a higher sale pressure on these stocks before the announcement 
which would not be expected from investors that have gained access to information 
regarding the announcement before the market. 
Another possible reason is that we are seeing stocks that have, in the past earnings 
seasons, disappointed investors which are now afraid to hold this stocks during the 
earnings period because of fear that the situation will repeat itself. Investor fear of the 
earnings announcement has been a discussed topic in the field of behavioral finance.  
To empirical test the probability of a stock having negative AAR dependant on it having 
disappointed in the past we used the following probit regression:  
& < 0 = '# + $ ∗ (    (5) 
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Where the dependent variable is defined as 1 if the stock has a negative AAR and 0 
otherwise, D is a dummy variable that states whether the stock disappointed 
(measured as a negative return during the earnings period) in the last earnings 
announcement and alpha and beta are estimated parameters.  
The parameters were obtained using the maximum likelihood estimation method. We 
find that # is equal to 46,47% and the $ parameter which is associated with the 
variable D is 1,95%. This means that the probability of having negative AAR is 1,95% 
higher for stocks that presented disappointing results in the last quarter. While past 
disappointments seem to explain part of the phenomenon a significant relation cannot 
be established between these and negative AAR to fully explain the effect.  
Anticipated regret, as discussed by Zeelenberg (1999) poses that individuals make their 
decisions influenced by the possibility they will later come to regret it and tend to 
avoid such situations. This may explain why some stocks have a significant reduction in 
price prior to the earnings announcement. Investors fearing they may later come to 
regret holding the stock during the earnings period decide to sell it before the 
announcement. 
However, it is again uncertain why this phenomenon is restricted only to some stocks 
and so the process by which a stock comes to have a negative abnormal return prior to 
the earnings announcement remains an open question.  
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7- Conclusions 
We have in this paper shown that it is possible to use AAR and SAR to identify stocks 
that have a higher expected return for the earnings announcement period. We find an 
asymmetric behavior for stocks with negative and positive abnormal returns. We have 
also shown that the implementation of these results can produce strategies that look 
very favorably when compared with a traditional buy and hold investment strategy, 
both in terms of average returns and risk adjusted measures.  
The results found are both statistically significant and economically significant. An 
investor following this strategy in the last 10 years could have had an average return of 
115% per year compared to -0,83% for an investment in the S&P 500 which is a 
fantastic result even when adjusted for the additional risk. 
We concluded that by isolating stocks with negative AAR or SAR we can identify better 
returns and that by using more demanding variations of these strategies can produce 
better average returns but at the expense of less investment opportunities. We show 
that this phenomenon is not exclusive to the US companies of the S&P 500, S&P Mid 
and S&P Small but is also present in other developed markets. 
We have also demonstrated that this phenomenon is distinct from the short-term 
mean reversion that is known to follow large movements in stocks. We prove that the 
returns obtained are inexorably linked to the earnings announcements and cannot be 
achieved outside this period. 
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Finally we presented some possible theories that try to explain the reasons for the 
occurrence of these opportunities. While we rejected the initial working hypothesis of 
insider trading as the cause of this phenomenon we find some evidence for the 
presence of investors fear based on previous disappointments. 
 
 
References 
Aboody, David, Reuven Lehavy and Brett Trueman. 2008. “Limited Attention and the 
Earnings Announcement Returns of Past Stock Market Winners”. 
Affleck-Graves, John Felix, Robert H. Jennings and Richard R.Mendenhall. 2005. 
“Evidence of Informed Trading Prior to Earnings Announcements”, Working Paper. 
Angel, James J., Michael G. Ferri, and Stephen E. Christophe. 2004. "Short Selling Prior 
to Earnings Announcements", Journal of Finance, 59(4): 1845-1875. 
Ball, Ray and Philip Brown. 1968. “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income 
Numbers”, Journal of Accounting Research, 6: 159-178. 
Bauman W. S, C.M. Conover and R.E. Miller. 1998. “Growth versus Value and Large-Cap 
versus Small-Cap Stocks in International Markets”, Financial Analysts Journal, 
May/April: 75-89.  
Bernard, V. and J. Thomas. 1990. “Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 13: 305. 
21 
 
Bernhardt, D. and D. Campello. 2007. “The dynamics of earnings forecast 
management”, Review of Finance 11: 287–324. 
Bollerslev, Tim, Julia Litvinova and George Tauchen. 2006. “Leverage and Volatility 
Feedback Effects in High-Frequency Data”, Journal of Financial Econometrics, 4(3): 353-
384. 
Brandt, M. W., R. Kishore, P. Santa-Clara, and M. Venkatachalam. 2006. “Earnings 
announcements are full of surprises”, Working Paper. 
Campbell, John Y., Andrew W. Lo and A. Craig MacKinlay. 1997. The Econometrics of 
Financial Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Princeton. 
Wong, M. 1997. “Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large One-day Advances and 
Declines: Evidence from Asia-Pacific Markets”, Financial Engineering and the Japanese 
Markets, 4(2): 171-177. 
Zeelenberg, M. (1999). “Anticipated regret, expected feedback and behavioral decision 
making”, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12: 93–106. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
Table 1. Average return divided in positive and negative AAR for the three S&P size 
based samples. AAR is calculated for the ranges going from the earnings day to 3, 5, 10 
and 20 days before. The return values presented are average holding period returns 
per observation of each sample.  
 
  AAR(3) AAR(5) AAR(10) AAR(20) 
S&P 500 
<0 0,91% 0,92% 0,84% 0,79% 
>0 0,22% 0,21% 0,28% 0,32% 
S&P MID 
<0 1,27% 1,26% 1,11% 1,06% 
>0 0,29% 0,33% 0,46% 0,51% 
S&P SMALL 
<0 1,04% 1,07% 0,95% 0,85% 
>0 0,07% 0,06% 0,13% 0,20% 
 
 
 
Table 2. Regression results for the three S&P samples estimated using the OLS method. 
T is the t-statistic value for the parameter besides it. IC95% is the lower and upper 
bound of a 95% confidence interval. R2 is the r-square value. 
 
  Coefficient T IC95% p-value R2 
  Α 0,58% 11,45 0,48% 0,67% 0,00% 
0,01 S&P 500 β -0,36 -9,81 -0,43 -0,28 0,00% 
 
Α 0,80% 12,34 0,67% 0,92% 0,00% 
 S&P Mid Β -0,40 -9,10 -0,49 -0,32 0,00% 0,01 
  Α 0,59% 8,93 0,46% 0,72% 0,00% 
 S&P SMALL Β -0,47 -12,26 -0,54 -0,39 0,00% 0,01 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for different levels of negative AAR for the three S&P 
samples. Return is the average holding period return per event, N is the number of 
events that pass the AAR condition, Stdev and Serror are respectively standard 
deviation and standard error and IC95% is the lower and upper bound of a 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
  Return N Stdev Serror IC95% p-value 
  <-PI% 4,21% 243 16,7% 1,07% 2,11% 6,31% 0,01% 
 
<-2% 2,27% 797 12,4% 0,44% 1,41% 3,13% 0,00% 
 
<-1% 1,64% 2559 9,2% 0,18% 1,29% 2,00% 0,00% 
S&P 500 <0 0,91% 8636 7,1% 0,08% 0,76% 1,06% 0,00% 
 
<-PI% 4,75% 196 13,5% 0,96% 2,87% 6,64% 0,00% 
 
<-2% 2,83% 616 12,1% 0,49% 1,88% 3,78% 0,00% 
 
<-1% 2,14% 2063 9,6% 0,21% 1,72% 2,55% 0,00% 
S&P MID <0 1,27% 6487 7,7% 0,10% 1,09% 1,46% 0,00% 
  <-PI% 3,85% 476 19,0% 0,87% 2,15% 5,55% 0,00% 
 
<-2% 2,63% 1324 14,6% 0,40% 1,84% 3,41% 0,00% 
 
<-1% 1,66% 3496 11,5% 0,19% 1,28% 2,05% 0,00% 
S&P SMALL <0 1,04% 9095 9,4% 0,10% 0,84% 1,23% 0,00% 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for different levels of SAR for the three S&P samples.  
 
  Return N Stdev Serror IC95% p-value 
  S&P 500 -0,12% 2303 5,8% 0,12% -0,35% 0,12% 34,35% 
 
S&P MID 0,05% 1617 7,1% 0,18% -0,30% 0,39% 79,87% 
SAR = 1 SMALL -0,30% 2234 8,6% 0,18% -0,66% 0,05% 9,28% 
  S&P 500 1,13% 2055 7,2% 0,16% 0,82% 1,44% 0,00% 
 
S&P MID 1,58% 1577 8,3% 0,21% 1,17% 1,99% 0,00% 
SAR = -1 S&P SMALL 1,15% 2186 11,0% 0,24% 0,68% 1,61% 0,00% 
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Table 5. Comparison of statistics for a buy and hold strategy on the S&P 500 and 
negative AAR strategies involving different levels of maximum portfolio exposure. 
Return is the average return per year, Stdev the annualized standard deviation and 
Sharpe the sharpe ratio calculated with a 3,23% risk-free interest rate according to the 
formula  =
))*
+
. 
 
SP500 Negative AAR 
 
  No limit 50% 25% 10% 
Return -0,83% 115,48% 87,04% 59,83% 33,23% 
Stdev 21,3% 51,9% 36,4% 24,8% 13,1% 
Sharpe -0,19 2,16 2,30 2,29 2,29 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of returns for stocks presenting negative AAR in the UK, 
France, Germany and Japan. 
  Return N Stdev Serror IC95% p-value 
FTSE 100 0,92% 895 6,4% 0,21% 0,50% 1,34% 0,00% 
CAC 40 0,55% 361 5,4% 0,29% -0,01% 1,11% 5,45% 
DAX 0,70% 486 5,3% 0,24% 0,23% 1,17% 0,39% 
Nikkei 225 0,40% 6029 5,2% 0,07% 0,26% 0,53% 0,00% 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of returns for stocks presenting negative AAR in days 
independent of earnings announcements. Difference is the difference between the 
return of the Earnings sample and the Random sample. Confidence intervals for the 
difference are calculated using a two-sample unpooled t-test. 
  Return N Stdev Serror IC95% p-value 
Random 0,21% 8137 4,0% 0,04% 0,12% 0,30% 0,00% 
Earnings 0,91% 8636 7,1% 0,08% 0,76% 1,06% 0,00% 
Difference 0,70%       0,53% 0,88% 0,00% 
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Figure 1. Histogram with frequency of returns for S&P 500 stocks with negative AAR. 
Superimposed is a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation. 
 
Figure 2. Q-Q plot comparing the relation between the quartiles of sample with 
earnings days and the sample with randomly chosen days. The dotted line a linear 
representation of this relation. 
 
